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| Abbott, Joshua K.; Wilen, James E.. |
| A canvass of the resource economics literature of the last thirty years yields a limited number of applications of economic theory to the problems of recreational fishing, especially compared to the depth of contributions to commercial fisheries over this era. This neglect may be linked to the relatively short shrift given to the control of recreational fisheries (relative to commercial fisheries) by fisheries managers in the past. This asymmetry may be justified when recreational takes are sufficiently small to be negligible for the purposes of stock management. However, it has become increasingly clear that recreational mortality, far from being insignificant, is often comparable to or greater than the commercial mortality for many species (Coleman, et... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6521 |
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| Abbott, Joshua K.. |
| This paper develops a single-season dynamic game between fishermen and regulators. Fishermen maximize the NPV of profits by their location choice in a system with congestion, adjustment costs, and adaptive, quota-driven, site closures. Simulation results reveal feedbacks between site-choice and closure decisions and suggest the usefulness of spatial policy instruments in reducing congestion externalities and costly congestion-averting expenditures. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20383 |
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| Abbott, Joshua K.; Wilen, James E.. |
| We develop a simple game-theoretic model to explain the production decisions of firms when the production of a marketed good is complementary with the output of an associated good for which no market is available and the output of both goods is regulated by exogenously determined common pool output quotas. This scenario matches that of many fisheries in which regulators attempt to simultaneously manage harvests of targeted species and bycatch of other species through common pool quotas and seasonal closures. Under a competitive equilibrium, individual fishermen fail to fully account for the external effects of their harvest decisions on the season length, leading to excessive discards, drastically shortened seasons, and large shares of un-harvested quota... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21468 |
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